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Introduction 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) states that as aviation systems are becoming more 
and more complex, human performance will no longer be able to be controlled using simple regulation 
intended to ensure safety. As a result, in 2011, the ICAO mandated the introduction of Annex 19, Safety 
Management Systems (EU: COM/2011/ 0670, ICAO, 2009, 2013). A safety management system (SMS) is a 
formal risk management framework for enhancing safety. An SMS should contain systems for: hazard 
identification and risk management; safety targets and reporting processes; procedures for audit; 
investigations; remedial actions to improve performance; and safety promotion and training. The size and 
complexity of an SMS should be tailored to suit the size and activities of each organization (Civil Aviation 
Authority New Zealand, 2015). However, implementing SMSs is not straightforward and there are often 
organizational obstacles (Gerede, 2015a).  
Safety performance indicators are an important part of the SMS as these allow for the establishment, 
implementation, and follow-up of policies related to safety (Øien, Utne, Tinmannsvik, & Massaiu, 2011). 
Organizations have to set targets and need to evaluate and manage the outcomes of their safety-related 
activities in order to be able to anticipate any vulnerabilities in their system (Hollnagel & Woods, 2006). 
Traditionally, safety performance measurement is achieved through the collection of data such as near 
misses, incidents, or damage associated with poor performance. These data are used as safety 
performance indicators (SPIs; Sgourou, Katsakiori, Goutsos, & Manatakis, 2010). These safety outcomes 
are known as lagging (or reactive) indicators, providing historical information, such as accident frequency 
and severity rates (one accident, 150 fatalities in 2015) or near misses (11 serious incidents in 2015; 
European Aviation Safety Agency [EASA], 2016; Sgourou et al., 2010; Toellner, 2001). Owing to the nature 
of lagging indicators, they cannot predict future performance nor do they give sufficient information as 
to why something happened. In contrast to lagging indicators, leading (or proactive) SPIs can be used to 
identify underlying causes and contributing factors of accidents, such as inappropriate or inadequate 
training or a lack of resources, and can be used as predictors or early warning indicators (Hinze, Thurman, 
& Wehle, 2013; Øien et al., 2011; Sgourou et al., 2010). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) uses the term indicators for the observable measures that provide insight into 
concepts that are related to safety and are difficult to measure directly (Harms-Ringdahl, 2009; OECD, 
2014).  
Management activities, guidelines, industry standards, organizing, planning, audit, performance 
measurement and quality principles are the basic components in any SMS (Santos-Reyes & Beard, 2008). 
The effectiveness of any SMS depends on the strength and the maturity of the system (Civil Air Navigation 
Services Organization [CANSO], 2014; Heese, 2012). An organization’s safety culture and management’s 
commitment to safety are the driving forces behind an effective SMS (CANSO, 2009; European 
Commission, 2012; Flemming, 2000; Parker, Lawrie, & Hudson, 2006; Schwarz & Kallus, 2015; Zohar, 
1980).  
Challenges identified as impeding the successful implementation of an SMS are the absence of a positive 
safety culture and the presence of a blame culture and punishment following error, which results in a lack 
of reporting. Although improvements in these areas can be a step forward for the management of safety, 
they are not sufficient for an SMS to be effective. Studies in other industries with similar systems have 
identified critical components for improving the performance of an SMS as well as barriers to its successful 
implementation (Aksorn & Hadikusumo, 2008; Bhattacharya & Tang, 2013; Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-
Peon, & Vazquez-Ordas, 2007; Ismail, Doostdar, & Harun, 2012), although, there have been very few 
studies related to SMSs in the aviation industry (Gerede, 2015b). Gerede (2015a) found that the most 
significant challenge for the successful implementation of an SMS is the problem of establishing a just 
culture. He further discusses the problems that create a poor safety culture and the consequences if these 
problems are not addressed.  
Studies have demonstrated a relationship between safety management practices and safety performance. 
Safety management practices can include, but are not limited to: management showing personal 
involvement in safety activities; provision of high-quality training for new employees and frequent training 
for existing employees; safety promotion for identifying hazards; higher priority for safety in meetings and 
in decisions concerning work practice; in-depth investigation of accidents; empowerment of the 
workforce (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011). When employees are involved in safety matters and are 
encouraged to work safely, this approach to managing safety at work may improve the desired outcomes 
(Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011).  
Hopkins (2000) and Baker et al. (2007) expressed the need for the industry to develop and implement 
improved SPIs. There are various reasons as to why such indicators are required. One of the reasons is to 
shape the behavior of management and staff. Effective indicators can drive the required performance 
while ineffective indicators will lead to misleading figures in performance measurement and may not give 
information concerning the real issues under consideration (Hudson, 2009). Valid safety knowledge is 
derived from data collected from appropriate SPIs, hence reliable and valid indicators (both prospective 
and retrospective) need to be identified and implemented for any SMS to be effective. Indicators should 
be both valid, that is, measure what we want them to measure, and reliable, that is give the same 
measurement result when used in the same situation but by different people (Hale, 2009).  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (Hale, 2009; IAEA, 1999) suggested that SPIs should possess a 
number of characteristics. They should have a direct relationship with safety, and necessary data should 
be available or easily generated. The indicators should be unambiguous and easy to understand, able to 
be expressed in quantitative terms but without them being susceptible to manipulation. The SPIs will be 
effective if they are manageable, valid, capable of being integrated into normal operational activities, and 
linked to the causes of a malfunction. They need to provide accurate data at each level to allow quality 
control and verification. Finally, organizations should be able to take corrective actions on the basis of the 
indicators and they should be cost-effective.  
SPIs need to be carefully selected and reviewed and re-evaluated over time. Manipulation of indicators 
by managers was evident in the Baker report for the BP refinery accident in Texas, contributing to a false 
sense of security. Manipulation implies changing the indicator to show a better score but without 
changing the underlying situation the indicator reflects (Hale, 2009). Inconsistencies and incoherence can 
exist in the approach taken for the selection of indicators. Two problems can be linked to the choice of 
SPIs: either too many possible indicators are utilized, reducing the mapping of safety-critical activities, or 
there is a failure to select correct and useful indicators. A systematic approach needs to be used to identify 
the proper indicators and how we can use these indicators to drive the SMS toward achieving its safety 
goals (Hudson, 2009).  
This study, therefore, examines practices that may play a role, promoting or hindering, in the 
implementation of an SMS and the choice of SPIs in the aviation industry. A qualitative approach was 
utilized as the emphasis was on insight, discovery, and development of a theory rather than the testing of 
a hypothesis (Cronbach, 1975; Merriam, 1988; Silverman, 1993).  
Method  
Participants  
Interview data were elicited from safety managers from the aviation industry. Involvement of these 
managers in the development and selection of the organization’s safety performance indicators was used 
as a criterion. Another criterion was to select safety managers from aviation operations of different kinds. 
The sample consisted of the safety managers from five aviation organizations (two medium – large 
airlines, two airports, and one navigation service provider). All participants were trained in the operation 
of SMSs.  
Data Gathering  
An introductory letter was sent to the participants by e-mail to inform them about the research, with a 
follow-up telephone call before the commencement of data collection. They were informed that the 
objective of the study was to investigate the effectiveness of the implementation of their SMSs and the 
development of effective SPIs. Participants were asked to participate in a semistructured interview 
session. The in-depth semistructured interview contained 33 questions: three to learn and know about 
the organizational factors that affect the safety of the organization; five to learn and know about the 
safety knowledge of the participants; 14 questions about their SMS; and 11 questions about SPIs. 
Examples of questions included: “How do you think the top management of an organization can affect the 
safety of an organization?” and “How does management promote the safety policy and the SMS?” (these 
examples were derived from the section of the interview related to safety). An example from the part of 
the interview related to the SMS was: “How are the employees trained in identifying hazards?” An 
example from the part of the interview related to SPIs was: “Does the reporting system give a clear picture 
of the most important risks in your work and does it help you manage them effectively?”  
The data collection was performed in two phases between June 2014 and August 2014. The duration of 
the semistructured interviews was approximately 2.5–3 hr. During the interview, the interviewer took 
notes of the interviewees’ answers. At the end of each interview, the interviews were transcribed and 
saved into word processor files for subsequent analysis. The data were then coded by hand. Data were 
treated ethically, maintaining the anonymity of the participants.  
Analysis  
A grounded theory approach was used for the analysis of the narrative data derived from the interviews 
with the safety managers in the five aviation organizations, using the procedures and techniques 
described by Strauss and Corbin (1990a). Strauss and Corbin (1990b) defined grounded theory as:  
One that is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents. That is, it is discovered, 
developed and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to 
that phenomenon... One does not begin with a theory then prove it. Rather, one begins with an area of 
study and what is relevant to that area is then allowed to emerge. (p. 23)  
The collection and method of analysis of the data are outlined in the following steps (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990a): 
• Data gathering 
• Open coding 
• Axial coding 
• Selective coding  
Each interview report was broken down into individual sentences or small groups of sentences that 
referred to a single observation from each interviewee. 
Open Coding  
Open coding was defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990a, p. 61) as: “The process of breaking down, 
examining, comparing, conceptualising and categorizing data.”  
The comments produced by the line-by-line analysis of transcripts were analyzed to generate categories 
into which they could be grouped. Concepts were developed using a continuous dialogue with the 
empirical data. Concepts are ways of summarizing data and they should be adapted to the data (Becker, 
1998, p. 109). The application of this method to the set of comments yielded an initial set of coding 
categories or dimensions. The comments were then re-coded using these categories to check for 
interrater reliability. Differences in coding were discussed and resolved to produce an agreed list of 
categories.  
Axial Coding  
Strauss and Corbin (1990a, p. 96) defined axial coding as: “A set of procedures whereby data are put back 
together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories.”  
This stage of analysis yielded a set of higher-order categories describing the connection or common 
properties between the lower-order categories. Comments were then re-evaluated within each category.  
Selective Coding  
Selective coding was defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990a, p. 116) as: “The process of selecting the core 
category [and] systematically relating it to other categories.” 
Strauss and Corbin (1990a) pointed out that this process is essentially similar to axial coding, but was 
conducted at a higher level of abstraction. A core category that emerges is the overarching phenomenon 
or concept that links each of the categories or phenomena that are developed during axial coding. After 
the core category was identified, further analysis of the comments in each category revealed the links 
between the categories identified during axial coding. Once all the categories were linked together to 
form a complete model, a narrative description was developed. 
Data Analysis and Model Development  
Open coding identified 15 dimensions containing factors that can obstruct the development of SPIs and 
hinder the performance of the SMS grouped under three properties. 
 Following up on the process of open coding, the comments produced from the line-by-line analysis of 
interview narrative data were grouped into three emergent main categories, namely, “Top management’s 
decisions influencing safety”; “Lack of safety culture”; and “Impractical and fearful data collection 
approach” (see Table 1). 
Top Management’s Decisions Influencing Safety  
During axial coding “allocation of resources,” “allocation of time,” “failure to clarify safety commitment,” 
“failure to participate in safety activities,” “not interested to know,” and “reluctance of management to 
allocate human resources for the investigation of incidents” were placed in the “managements’ decisions” 
category (Table 1).  
Allocation of Resources  
From the interviewees’ transcripts it was observed by the researchers that some safety managers shared 
the perception that management would not allocate the money, extra working hours, or resources for 
hiring additional personnel:  
In order to perform the investigations people should be removed from the roster or work during 
their days off and this causes a delay in the investigation of incidents.  
Allocation of Time  
Based on the following comment it was noted that the management of some aviation companies would 
not allocate time for the risk assessments and employees needed to work on their days off in order to 
complete the risk assessments:  
Risk assessments are not effectively performed; they are problematic as there is a delay because 
people need to be removed from the roster or work during their days off or work overtime.  
Failure to Clarify Safety Commitment  
On the basis of the comments, it was noted that interviewees perceived that management was not 
committed to safety as the company management did not show that they were at all interested in safety:  
When it comes to (top) management’s commitment to safety they don’t want to know, they don’t 
have the knowledge or they don’t want to show that they are interested.  
Failure to Participate in the Safety Activities  
On the basis of the following comment, it was perceived that management does not show an interest in 
the safety activities or want to know about these activities, and it was middle management who handles 
the safety issues:  
When it has to do with needs in the safety department, they [top management] don’t want to 
know, they don’t want to show they are interested. Only middle management handles operations 
and safety.  
Not Interested to Know or Learn Anything About Safety  
From the next statement, it was indicated that middle management perceived that top management did 
not care and at the same time top management does not prioritize safety issues within the organization:  
(Top) management either doesn’t want to know, or they do not have the knowledge, or they do 
not want to show the least interest in safety matters. It’s the middle management who handles 
the safety issues.  
From these statements, it was indicated that the middle management from some aviation service 
providers perceived that top management did not care and at the same time top management did not 
prioritize safety issues within the organization.  
Delay in the Investigation of Accidents  
On the basis of the following comments, “delay in the investigation of accidents” was placed in the top 
management’s decisions category as this could have facilitated investigations and made the findings 
available sooner (Table 1). 
In order to perform the investigations people should be removed from the roster or work during 
their days off and this causes a delay in the investigation of incidents. 
Lack of Safety Culture  
During the axial coding stage, “lack of safety promotion,” “lack of safety training,” “lack of just culture,” 
“lack of trust between personnel,” “lack of attention to what personnel is saying,” “lack of encouragement 
by top management,” and “resistance to change” were all placed in the “safety culture” category.  
“Lack of just culture” was identified as a common property, which hindered the successful collection of 
safety data from the reporting system. To illustrate, one interviewee commented:  
[Employees] don’t know what is acceptable and unacceptable in terms of judicial authority taking 
over.  
Lack of Safety Promotion  
On the basis of the following comment from one participant, it was noted that top management was not 
promoting the SMS:  
The [top] management doesn’t really promote the SMS...  
The following comments indicate that the organization did not promote the safety policy and SMS to their 
employees, and the employees have asked from the safety manager to make a presentation. 
Employees do not completely understand the safety policy. We know because they asked the 
safety manager for a presentation. SMS and Safety Policy, is very little promoted by top 
management.  
Lack of Training  
The following statement implies that the employees did not receive training to identify hazards and 
employees were required to use their common sense to identify hazards:  
Employees were not trained to identify hazards, this is based on their instinct and their common 
sense.  
The next statements indicate that some organizations present an overview of how the SMS works and do 
not provide recurrent training to their employees even if it is stated in the manuals that the employees 
need to receive recurrent training.  
Training in safety and SMS, an overview how the system works [is provided], we still have room 
for improvement. Recurrent training is only written in the manuals.  
The following statement indicates that some organizations do not use the information from the reporting 
system to train employees and it depends on the manager of each unit to feed back the information given 
to him/her by the safety manager. 
We don’t have an official lessons learnt process; it depends on the manager of each unit to inform 
the people. 
Lack of Trust Between Personnel  
On the basis of the following comment, it was regarded that the employees might be reluctant to report 
anything because they do not trust their colleagues since other employees might be able to identify the 
reporter. 
Reporting is not encouraged because other employees can identify the reporter especially if one 
or two people were working on that particular shift the time when the event took place. 
Lack of Attention to What the Employees Are Saying 
Lack of attention to what an aviation service provider’s safety managers were saying was identified as a 
common component in the “safety culture” and “reporting systems” categories (see Table 1).  
Every time we ask them to give a campaign on reporting they keep saying that they will do it the 
following week and they never do it.  
It was perceived that top management did not care about what they were asking, and this has a great 
effect on safety culture. Management did not care and they showed it. This is even more obvious from 
the following comment from one employee:  
What management shows us is that we will do something if we have time, when we have time.  
As implied, in some organizations, management was not regarded as promoting the SMS and also did not 
provide training for the identification of hazards. Workers needed to use their common sense, but this of 
course depended on the perceptions of each individual concerning what he or she considered to be a 
hazard. Lack of training also resulted in a lack of knowledge of the benefits of making contributions to the 
reporting systems. In addition, if personnel were trained more on how they could benefit from the 
reporting hazards and how this could reduce the rate of incidents, they would have cared more about 
reporting the hazards and cared less about who did what.  
The following comment indicates that when middle management wanted to discuss the safety needs of 
the organization, top management did not want to know and they did not want to show any interest.  
When it has to do with needs in the safety department, they don’t want to know, they don’t want 
to show they are interested. Only middle management handles operations and safety. 
Lack of Encouragement to Report by Top Management  
After discussion it was decided that “lack of encouragement to report” was best categorized under “safety 
culture” because encouragement can be a characteristic of the inner environment and a feature of the 
organization that can be influenced by the people working within the organization (Schwarz & Kallus, 
2015; von Rosenstiel & Nerdinger, 2011).  
Several statements indicate that employees are not encouraged to report issues, and they only receive an 
overview of how the SMS works. It was indicated that although recurrent training is mentioned in the 
manuals, the organization does not give recurrent training to employees to encourage them to report.  
When it comes to reporting there is no encouragement and there are bureaucratic procedures.  
The next statement indicates that the actions of top management fail to encourage employees to report. 
Instead of using the reporting system for improvement, they are using it to penalize.  
The next statement indicates that when the organization was not under the same facility, some 
departments might have received less encouragement to report, especially if the safety department was 
not located in the same facility in order to promote reporting. Bureaucratic procedures might also cause 
lack of encouragement and this is emphasized when the organizations are in different locations.  
There are units that are isolated from the whole system, without any information on reporting, 
there are bureaucratic procedures.  
Resistance to Change  
Resistance to change was found to be one of the dimensions best placed under the “safety culture” 
category. Interviewees expressed their opinion that remedial actions became a difficult task as it involved 
a number of people and sometimes the action to be taken depended on other people. 
It is a matter of how easy something can be done and you have to wait for the others; it’s not that 
easy, it has to do with the number of people involved. 
Impractical and Fearful Data Collection Approach  
Comments about reporting systems were further decomposed into “fear of punishment that impairs 
reporting” and “impracticality of reporting systems that hinders the reporting process” (see Table 1). 
Fear of Punishment That Impairs Reporting  
The following statement indicates that when personnel worked by themselves, knowing that no one saw 
them committing an error, they would not report because they were afraid of punishment.  
The disadvantage of reporting is that sometimes you work by yourself, so in that case you would 
not report yourself.  
The next statement indicates that in the organization of this interviewee, higher management is using the 
reporting system to penalize the reporter or to ask for explanation.  
Instead of improvement, they use it to penalize or ask for explanations.  
Impracticality of Reporting System That Hinders the Reporting Process  
The following statement demonstrates the impracticality of that particular reporting system.  
Reporting is not encouraged because other employees can identify the reporter especially if one 
or two people were working on that particular shift the time when the event took place.  
The following statement again implies there is a lack of just culture that affects the reporting system and 
as a result the organization lacks safety-critical information for the development of SPIs.  
The reporting system is just a book in the other room where the employee would go and report 
the event.  
The previous statements are indications of the impracticality of the reporting system. In some cases, 
workers were effectively discouraged or even embarrassed to report because this action would be obvious 
and at the same time they could be identified by the other workers because of the small number of people 
who were working on the same specific shifts. 
A Model of Factors Impeding the Development of SPIs  
Selective coding is the process by which all the categories are combined around a single “core” category 
that represents the central phenomenon or that can be identified by asking the question, “What is the 
main analytic idea presented in this research?” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The main idea presented in this 
study is identifying factors that can obstruct the development of SPIs and hence hinder the performance 
of safety management systems in aviation.  
The importance of this stage of grounded theory development is the development of an overall model. 
The core category identified was the “obstacles in developing safety performance indicators.”  
The connection between “top management decisions influencing safety,” “lack of safety culture,” and 
“impractical and fearful data collection” may be summarized as follows: The decisions of top management 
influenced the safety culture of the organization and the lack of a safety culture has a subsequent impact 
on the reporting systems making them impractical to use and creating a fear of reporting in employees. 
Results and Discussion  
The purpose of this study was to identify and describe factors that may promote or impede the 
development of SPIs in aviation organizations and service providers.  
Figure 1 shows the model derived from the interview data and grounded theory analysis of the factors 
that can impede, delay, and/or mislead an organization in creating their SPIs. Several features of the 
model were consistent with the findings of Gerede (2015a), who also showed how the success of the 
safety management systems could be impeded. Gerede (2015a) identified the failure of the reporting 
system, acceptable and unacceptable behavior not being distinguished, fear of punishment, and hazards 
that remain hidden as the main factors contributing to the success or failure of an SMS. The model 
developed also suggests that top management, culture, and data collection processes are significant 
factors that could either individually or in combination influence the success of the SMS by impeding the 
development of the appropriate practice. 
The Perceived Role of Top Management  
While attempting to uncover the factors that impede the development of SPIs, it was found that the 
perception of the interviewees that management showed little or no interest in knowing about safety 
issues was one such factor (Table 1). The interviewees reported that employees said that management 
led them to understand that they (management) will take action about an issue only when and if they 
have time. The employees’ perception about management was that they do not prioritize safety actions, 
but on the contrary they would only take an action at their convenience. However, for top management 
to demonstrate commitment to safety the manager will be required to possess high levels of safety 
knowledge to act appropriately with respect to safety matters and communicate the facts to the 
personnel. As a result, the safety knowledge will enable managers to understand safety-related 
information, draw meaningful conclusions from it, and then demonstrate their commitment to safety by 
their actions (Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, & Kirwan, 2014a).  
Employees feel that when it comes to safety, management does not want to know, does not have the 
knowledge, and/ or is not interested in knowing. Because of this, it would seem that management does 
not prioritize safety. Neal and Griffin (2004, pp. 15–34) define the safety commitment of management as, 
“the extent to which management is perceived to place a high priority to safety and communicate and act 
on safety issues.” Zohar (1980) also found that management’s commitment to safety is a major factor that 
can affect the success of an organization’s safety management system. Studies have shown that senior 
management can influence 45% of the organization’s performance and have a significant influence on 
organizational safety (Clarke, 1999; Day & Lord, 1988; Fruhen et al., 2014b).  
If sufficient resources are not allocated, SPIs cannot be developed. Personnel in the interviews said that 
management would not allocate the necessary funds for increasing the number of personnel. This meant 
that people had to divide their working time between working their shift and performing the SMS 
activities. Lack of available personnel was forcing people to concentrate on their primary job, having no 
time to perform SMS activities. As a result of this, incidents would fail to be investigated for several 
months and the development of SPIs based on the hazards identified that contributed to the accident had 
to wait until the safety team developed the SPIs during their days off. The success of the SMSs declines 
when management fails to allocate resources or show a willingness to improve the system (Gerede, 
2015b).  
On a related topic, delays in the performance of risk assessments and incident investigations were also 
related to the development of SPIs (Table 1). Employees said that risk assessments were also not 
effectively performed. This again means that hazards and risks remained in the system until they were 
eventually identified and addressed. SPIs were not developed as soon as the hazards and risks were 
identified; they had to wait until the safety team was removed from the roster or worked overtime or 
during their own free time, meaning that there was a gap between the hazard identification and the 
development of the SPIs, leaving the system exposed to these hazards. Even if all the other components 
of the SMS are working effectively, if risk management fails, then it is likely that the SMS will be 
unsuccessful (Gerede, 2015b).  
Another important factor contributing to an unsuccessful SMS was lack of promoting the SMS. 
Interviewees said that management does not promote the SMS and they have to use their instinct and 
common sense to identify the hazards. This means that what constitutes a hazard for someone might not 
necessarily constitute a hazard for someone else, leaving this to the subjective opinion of each individual. 
As a result, hazards can be left unreported, because the individual might not have considered the event 
as hazardous. Various studies have identified that specific safety practices, such as initial and recurrent 
training for employees, display of safety posters for identifying hazards, communication between 
workforce and managers, personal involvement of management in safety issues, and making a high 
priority of safety in meetings predict safety performance. Organizations having these safety practices have 
lower accident rates (Cohen, 1977; Cohen, Smith, & Cohen, 1975; DePasquale & Geller, 1999; Griffiths, 
1985; Harper et al., 1997; Shafai & Shahrai, 1971; Shannon et al., 1996; Shannon, Mayr, & Haines, 1997; 
Smith, Cohen, Cohen, & Cleveland, 1975).  
Employee involvement in safety activities is a key element for the success of an SMS. But to achieve this, 
people first need to be trained. In the current study, it was found that people did not receive training on 
the SMS. Interviewees reported that they did not receive SMS training, and they were not trained to 
identify hazards. They used only their common sense for their identification. As previously mentioned, 
not knowing what can be a hazard means that hazards go unnoticed, not reported, and not developed 
into SPIs. A key element for the success of an SMS is effective safety training. Safety training provides the 
means for making accidents more predictable (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010). Studies have shown that 
organizations that do not receive adequate training on risk assessment do not perform it adequately 
(Gerede, 2015a).  
Another finding was the lack of attention by top management to what the workforce was saying. 
Interviewees have been asked by the workforce to provide them with training on reporting systems, or 
launch a campaign about reporting. The interviewees reported that every time they ask top management 
for these courses for the employees, management tells them that they will give them training but they 
never do. This gives employees the impression that management does not pay attention to what they are 
asking, and this can have a negative effect on the organization’s safety culture and discourage people to 
adopt a safe behavior. Regular communication about safety issues between top management and the 
workforce is an effective safetymanagement practice that can improve performance (Vinodkumar & 
Bhasi, 2010). Studies by Cohen (1977), Cox and Cheyne (2000), Mearns, Whitaker, and Flin (2003), and 
Vredenburgh (2002) all showed that the safety performance of an organization is influenced by the level 
of communication.  
Lack of encouragement by top management to report issues was another factor that was mentioned in 
the study. Participants said that they were not encouraged to report issues. One reason was because they 
felt that other people could identify them. Another reason was that because they did not know what was 
acceptable and unacceptable, they were afraid to report. A third reason was that they felt that the 
reporting system was impractical, allowing other people to identify the reporter. Such a lack of 
encouragement impairs the reporting system and safety data collection of the organization, leaving 
hazards unidentified and not investigated. The use of incentives and recognition in motivating personnel 
to perform safely can add interest to the hazard control program of an organization (Cohen et al., 1975; 
Hagan, Montgomery, & O’Reilly, 2001). Vredenburgh (2002) also recognizes that safety promotion in 
terms of creating awareness for reporting hazards encourages workers to report safety matters. 
Lack of Safety Culture  
The findings also suggest that there may be a lack of just culture. Employees reported that it is not clear 
what should be acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Because it was not clear for them what the 
organization and juridical authority considers as being acceptable and unacceptable, they were reluctant 
to report their actions for fear of prosecution. As a result, occurrences that should have been investigated 
to find out what happened, why it happened, and how to prevent it from happening again now go 
unnoticed. The biggest concern with judicial action following an aviation accident or incident was focused 
on how it interfered with independent safety investigation and undermined the willingness of people to 
voluntarily report errors and violations (Berlinger, 2005; Brous, 2008; Chapman, 2009; Dekker, 2007, 2009, 
2011; Flight Safety Foundation, 2006; Thomas, 2007).  
A lack of trust between personnel was also reported as a factor impeding the reporting and thus the 
development of SPIs. Interviewees said that reporting was not encouraged because other employees 
could identify the reporter, especially if it was only two people working on the shift when the incident 
took place. Because people were reluctant to report occurrences, this inaction gave the opportunity for 
hazards to remain unreported. A common response of professionals was to become better at making the 
evidence go away and not reporting errors: “Practising under the threat of prosecution can only serve to 
hide errors” (Chapman, 2009, pp. 57–59; Dekker, 2011).  
Resistance to change was also found to be a factor delaying the development of SPIs. Employees 
interviewed stated that even if things or situations could easily be changed the situations would still not 
change because they had to wait for someone’s approval or because other people were involved in the 
change. Depending on others to make changes, or having a large number of people involved to approve 
the recommendations, allocate resources, or communicate with other parties, involved delays in the 
improvement of the situation. In fact, this can be a long process and take time until some action is taken. 
SMS will not be implemented successfully in organizations where there is a culture of only acting through 
habit and where there is resistance to change (Gerede, 2015a). 
Impractical and Fearful Data Collection Approach  
Fear of punishment was identified in this study as a factor impeding the development of SPIs. Employees 
said that reporting is not encouraged by management as they were not given training on the reporting 
system including acceptable and unacceptable behavior. This meant that because people were not 
informed of what was acceptable and unacceptable behavior and because they were afraid that reporting 
their error could result in their prosecution, they were reluctant to report their errors.  
Findings suggest that the impracticability of the reporting system can hinder the reporting process and 
the development of SPIs. Employees said that in several cases the reporting system was merely a book in 
which the employee would report the occurrence. Because of the nature of the reporting system, the 
person reporting could be easily identifiable especially in the case where only two people were working 
on a shift. Employees knew that others could trace the reporter by checking the roster system. This 
impracticality of the reporting system hinders its success because employees are reluctant and 
discouraged from reporting. Incident data are a key element for the function of the SMS. From the data 
on incidents taken from the reporting systems, safety metrics can be derived and risk assessment can be 
conducted; however, the quality of the data can influence the results (Sabine, Majumdar, & Ochieng, 
2014). 
Conclusion  
On the basis of interviews with safety managers in the aviation industry about safety practices in their 
organizations, a model of factors that may impede the effective functioning of an SMS and the SPIs was 
developed. The main factors in the less-than-optimal functioning of an SMS may be: the role of top 
management, the lack of safety culture, and the effectiveness of the data collection approach, either 
individually or in combination. When present in aviation organizations, these factors are believed to 
impede the development of SPIs and thus the effectiveness of the SMSs. Organizations should use both 
leading and lagging SPIs to measure their safety performance. The reported factors may be indicative of 
practices in other aviation service providers as well. Knowledge of these impeding factors may help 
organizations to improve their SPIs and the success of their SMS. Addressing the factors that impede the 
development of SPIs can help organizations measure safety in a way that reflects their performance. 
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Table 1.  Dimensions of the impeding factors of SPI implementation derived from the Open 
Coding process. 




Management’s decisions -Allocation of resources 
-Allocation of time/roster 
-Failure to clarify safety 
commitment 
-Failure to participate in 
safety activities 
-Not interested to know/ 
learn anything related to 
safety 
-Delay in the investigation 
of accidents. 
Lack of safety culture Just culture -Lack of safety promotion 
-Lack of safety training 
-Lack of just culture 
-Lack of trust between 
personnel 
-Lack of attention to what 
workforce is saying 
- Lack of encouragement 
by top management to 
report 
-Resistance to change 
Impractical and fearful 
data collection approach 
Reporting systems -Fear of punishment that 
impairs reporting 
-Impracticality of reporting 





Figure 1. Factors impeding the development of SPIs showing the gaps between SMS and actual 
performance 
